

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

Chief, SE

26 September 1952

Attn: (

Chief (

BGFIEND

ZRCROWN Debriefing of Sambo

REFERENCE: (

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1. Forwarded under separate cover is the ZRCROWN debriefing questionnaire of Sambo, which was passed to us on 11 September by (

2. As reported in (), we were notified of Sambo's safe infiltration via sea. () reports Sambo's exfiltration overland o/a 10 August. When () notified us of Sambo's exfiltration he also told us that Sambo was actually infiltrated overland. Not only was this team infiltrated overland rather than by sea as first reported by (), they also operated outside their assigned operational area. You will note in () that () attributed Sambo's exfiltration to the alarm created in their area of operation by our leaflet raid of 28 July and resupply of 4 August. We carefully avoided the area given us by () as Sambo's area of operation in our flight paths but, as Sambo was operating far out of their area of operation and our plane did overfly the area and create alarm, Sambo was forced to exfiltrate.

3. Re (): Unfortunately this () can not comment accurately as in the case of Scrutiny as BGFIEND was not invited to debrief Sambo. BGFIEND was able to debrief Scrutiny because we furnished some equipment for this team in addition to the services of ().

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

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Attachment (s.c.)

1. Sambo debriefing

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

Attachment 1 to

SAMBO. Reply to Questionnaire

1. Security Forces

- (a) The Security forces are the soundest and best trained military arm. They have won successes and are trusted by the Government.
- (b) Security troops are distributed to every prefecture and to many sub-prefectures, especially those near the frontier. They are normally stationed at the centres of these districts, though sometimes at other strategic points. There are bodies, probably companies, for example at COROVODE, the SURAPAR subprefecture centre, at PERMET subprefecture centre and also at FRASHER for the DANGELLI area, and at ERSEKE subprefecture centre.
- (c) If any resistance movement is discovered these forces come into operation at once and deal with it unmercifully. They move quickly either by road or across country.
- (d) These forces are also called out wherever a foreign aircraft passes and comb the districts for agents or articles that may have been dropped. Wherever an aircraft passes, therefore, the district becomes a danger zone at least for some days for any existing resistance elements.

Supplementary question: What is the Special Battalion?

- (a) These are the special troops distributed to localities as mentioned above. Battalion HQ would be at prefecture centres, and companies at the smaller centres, e.g. SKRAPAR, PERMET, ERSEKE, etc. It is not known if they include "mobile units" of the Army, but they are known as SIGURIMI troops.

2. Political Opinion

- (a) Those who would support the regime under any circumstances are:

The few convinced Communists such as political commissars, and one-third of the senior officers of the Army.

A portion of the youth who come from the morally bankrupt sections of the people and who have committed crimes or whose characters have been otherwise corrupted. They find themselves in good official positions or see possibilities of rising and they have no hopes in other circumstances. These largely help to keep Communism alive.

- (b) Those who would cooperate with the Committee:

All intellectuals such as office employees and teachers, traders (whatever work they may be doing now); the people of the country districts in general, who have suffered much at the hands of the regime; and the towns people who are not among the categories of (a) above.

~~TOP SECRET~~

83896
End -1

TOP SECRET

~~SECURITY~~ INFORMATION
- 2 -

All these people are against the Government and MOSCOW and politically attached to the Committee and the West.

In the same way two-thirds of the senior officers of the Army, and most of the junior officers and soldiers are prepared to support the Committee. They share the feelings of the majority of the people against the regime and are also discontented with their conditions and long term of service.

It is not possible to give names of those who are prepared to cooperate because this would mean virtually providing a nominal roll of most of the Army and the people.

(c) The conditions on which the categories in (b) above would take action against the regime are simple: a definite promise of help from the Committee and the Western Powers, and a physical fulfillment of that promise. This promise and help is the only thing required to make them move, but it is the one concrete base for action that they must have.

The point of view of the people is summarized as follows: "Owing to the strong and ruthless security and spy system that holds us down we can not make any move except a decisive one. And this decisive move can only be made if we have the assurance of Western support. If we take any individual or local action now we lack the means and can be destroyed piecemeal, with our families. If we are promised help and receive that help, we are then prepared to 'burn our boats' - i.e., to abandon our homes and caution and come out into the open. When that situation arises the whole people would respond and the great majority of the Army. In the case of the Army, most officers and men would be likely to desert and join the people, so that the Army would break up.

The help asked for is (i) messengers whom they know to be sent to them telling them that a decision to help them has been taken and stating a period, e.g. one month ahead; (ii) at times and places agreed to be sent to them. Food is also desirable.

The following points are intended to be explanatory of the above:

(d) The first question asked of a SAMBO member on his return visit to his friends was "Is there anything?" (A ka gje?), i.e. "Do you bring a promise this time?" This is the only thing they are waiting to know.

(e) Local, tightly knit resistance organizations do not exist, owing to the security spies. But the people know their friends and enemies and have a clear understanding with their friends regarding the action they would take when the moment came. The few enemies would not count when action started; they would be liquidated at once.

(f) It is urged that one good thing the Committee agents could do would be to liquidate the local spies now. If one or two groups of spies were liquidated others would be afraid to work and the regime would lose its eyes and ears.

TOP SECRET

83894

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

SECURITY INFORMATION

(g) In the south two districts are vital, owing to their commanding situation, SKRAPAR and KURVELESH. If those districts were prepared and, say, 1,000 weapons sent to each, at various chosen points around them, they could be taken and held by the people. The people would warn the officers and troops whom they knew, and they would join them. Similar action would have to be taken in the north.

3. Other Information on the Political Situation

(a) The people do not fear the police as much as the local Communist party members and organizations with their local activities and their spies. They are the strength of Communism in ALBANIA today and a source of great harm to the people.

(b) The Government is in a constantly nervous state. It has no faith in itself and is frequently making change and movement throughout its organizations, to try and make a show of strength. It has lost the trust of the people which to some extent it had from 1945 - 1947. It knows that 'reaction' is very strong today and therefore makes a point of publicly saying it is weak. They maintain their constant attempts to build themselves up by propaganda, by radio, conferences, etc. But all their statements are 'sound and fury' and lack all reality. The people have seen through their lies. Instead of the progress the Government boasts of, there is nothing but misery. The greatest factor antagonizing the people towards the regime is their bad economic situation.

(c) In local councils, taking their cue from higher up, party members discuss what action could be taken in the event of an anti-regime outbreak. They feel that Government and Party organizations are weak because they lack popular support and they are afraid of every Allied move. The position of Communism in ALBANIA has weakened.

(d) Factory workers are not convinced Communists except for the few youths of the more corrupt type referred to above, and for the 'responsible' officials. In every place of work sabotage exists. Pay and living conditions of workers are bad, but they can not get out of work. The regime has great need of manual workers and takes people by force for such work or forces them into it by economic pressure. Those who try to escape from the net meet with punishment.

4. Relations Between Hoxha and Shehu

Their personal relations are bad, largely owing to the egoism and jealousy of SHEHU. He considers himself the victor of the Albanian revolution. He is working to achieve leadership and endeavours to be heard in public as much as possible and to gain the sympathy of the people. But the people do not like him, in fact they dislike him so much that they do not even mention his name. SHEHU has a few followers, including officers who served in his partisan brigade.

Hoxha's closest friend is Bedri SPAHIU.

TOP SECRET

83894

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

- 4 -

5. Political Parties

The Communist Party itself has done much to make the BALLI KOMBETAR known, and to encourage faith in it, by its constant propaganda against it. BALLI members are constantly working against the regime and incurring arrest and imprisonment. Anyone accused of a political offense is called a BALLIST. Other parties are not spoken of.

Comment: The source is evidently speaking only of the south and of those parts of the south which he knows.

6. Economic

(a) Private traders no longer exist.

(b) So far as the peasant is concerned all purchase is by barter at the State consumers' cooperatives.

(c) The people as a whole continue not only to have most of their agricultural production taken away but they do not see the products of the factories. These are:

(i) made available to Party officials and Russians and for the forces, and

(ii) exported.

(d) Peasants just manage to keep themselves alive. This can not be said of those towns people who have no ration books. Five or six cases of death from starvation occurred in KORCE town during the present year.

(e) Farmers' obligations have been decreased in some cases. In SAMBO's area the following is the present scale per dynym ($\frac{1}{2}$ acre):

Grain - 1st class land: 25 kg.
2nd class land: 15 kg.
3rd class land: 5 kg.

Meat - $2\frac{1}{2}$ kg.

Eggs - 4

Wool - 150 gr.

In 1951, in this mountainous area, the amount of the grain obligation was 15 kg. for 3rd class land. Reductions have been made all round and this is said to apply to all districts.

Comment: We can not obtain comparable figures on all counts for 1951.

7. Communications

(a) No important new roads are being constructed at present in the

~~TOP SECRET~~

83894

TOP SECRET

- 5 - SECURITY INFORMATION

south, except for one from the site of the new oil refinery at CERRIK, ELBASAN to KUCOVE.

(b) Telephone lines are working regularly. Old telephone instruments which had become unserviceable owing to lack of spare parts have been replaced by Russian instruments.

8. Construction

(a) Work on the new oil refinery at CERRIK, ELBASAN, started in April this year.

(b) A mineral prospecting organization which worked with a few employees in Italian times at REMOVE (M 9143) has now been strengthened. It is said to be looking for various metals including gold.

TOP SECRET

83894